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THE DIRECTION OF THE COURT:
Reflections on the Recent Past and Implications for the Future
By Troy R. Rackham
What kind of a Court is the Rehnquist Court? In what jurisprudential direction is the Court headed?
Is it a conservative Court? Is it an activist Court? Which justices hold the swing vote? Are certain
justices more influential than others? Who is the next to retire? Who will be the next justice? This
section discusses these and other questions.
The 1997-1998 term was an interesting one for the Supreme Court. While the Court took only a
few cases presenting constitutional questions, it announced decisions significantly altering the landscape
in several areas of the law, including sexual harassment, the Americans with Disabilities Act, attorney-
client privilege, antitrust, banking, and private property. Notably, while the Court only heard a few
cases presenting constitutional questions, two of those cases addressed the constitutionality of two
popular laws passed by Congress. First, the Court struck down the line-item veto law as violating the
"presentment" clause in Article I. Second, the Court upheld the Congressionally imposed standards
of decency upon grants given by the National Endowment for the Arts against a first amendment
challenge.
Most commentators agree that the most significant issue addressed by the 1997-1998 Court was
sexual harassment. Indeed, in three different cases, the Court provided clear and distinct answers to
many of the questions left open by lower courts regarding sexual harassment. In Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Services, the Court unequivocally held that Title VII's proscription of sexual harassment
applies just as equally to same-sex harassment as it does to opposite-sex harassment. All that is
important, according to the Court, is that the harassment is "based on sex," as Title VII requires.
Additionally, in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton and Burlington Industries v. Ellerth the Court
strengthened Title VII's protections against sexual harassment in the workplace by imposing stricter
standards upon employers and by allowing employees to recover for the harassment of employers
without showing job-related harm. Finally, in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, the
Court imposed a very restrictive standard upon students suing public schools over the alleged
harassment of their teachers, immunizing schools from liability unless the school knew about the
harassing conduct and failed to stop the harassment out of "deliberate indifference." Some
commentators suggest that this creates an anomaly in sexual harassment law because the Supreme
Court has made it easier for employees to sue for sexual harassment, while at the same time making
it practically impossible for students to sue for the similar conduct of teachers.
The Court also announced other decisions affecting important areas of the law. The Court
broadened the scope of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) by holding that the ADA proscribes
discrimination against asymptomatic HIV positive individuals, Bragdon v. Abbott, and by holding that
the ADA applies to inmates in prison, Pennsylvania v. Yeskey. Further, the Court held that the
attorney-client privilege extends beyond the grave, Swidler v. Berlin; that price ceilings set by retailers
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do not violate the Sherman Antitrust Act, State Oil v. Khan; that police must have acted with intent
to harm in order for an individual injured as a result of a high speed chase to recover under § 1983,
Sacramento v. Lewis; and finally that the IOLTA funding source, which provides funds for legal aid
organizations, uses interests gained from private property and therefore may amount to a taking of
property in violation of the "Takings" clause, Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation.
Most Supreme Court commentators look to the past in order to predict the future. These
commentators argue that the Court's recent focus on smaller issues affecting a broad range of
Americans rather than on resolving the heated Constitutional concerns of the day suggest that the
modern Rehnquist Court is more interested in pragmatism than ideology. Indeed, rather than search
for new rights among the "penumbras," as earlier Courts did, some commentators claim that the current
Court simply seeks "manageable standards" and practical solutions to everyday legal problems. To
buttress this argument, some commentators posit that the lower number of cases granted certiorari by
the Rehnquist Court (the number of cert. grants issued in recent years has dropped significantly from
1989, when the Court granted cert. to over 120 cases) reflects an anti-activist desire- a desire to
address only issues compelling adjudication for pragmatic (e.g., to resolve circuit splits) rather than
ideological reasons.
As to the future direction the Court will take, much will depend, of course, on whether any of the
current justices retire, and if so, who replaces them. Many observers speculate that Justice Stevens will
be the next to retire. Others predict the retirements of Justice O'Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist.
No matter who retires, most observers argue that the next justice will likely be Hispanic so long as
Clinton is still in office. Judge Jose Cabranes of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals is one of the
candidates frequently discussed.
This section begins by examining the Court's last term. The articles commenting on the 1997-1998
term, in the main, argue that the Court was concerned with issues affecting the common American-
a "Court that Suburbia Could Love." Some articles suggest that the traditional conservative/ liberal
alliances of the Rehnquist Court were called into question last term. This section then moves on to
discuss the influences of individual justices. Some of the articles suggest that Kennedy is the "swing
vote"-- the justice parties need to convince in order to win. Other articles argue that O'Connor plays
this role, while some even suggest that maybe Rehnquist now even "swings." Additional articles
examine the influences of Justices Scalia, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Finally, this section ends by
speculating on possible retirements and, concomitantly, on possible replacements.
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SUPREME COURT ACTS BOLDLY, REVEALS EVOLVING ALLIANCES;
CONSERVATIVES PART WAYS ON SOME CLOSE DECISIONS
The Sun (Baltimore)
June 28, 1998
By Lyle Denniston, SUN NATIONAL STAFF
WASHINGTON -- The Supreme Court, a modest tribunal that prefers to avoid surprises, showed
again in its just-ended term that it can engage now and then in bold judicial ventures.
And, though its membership has not changed over a four-year span, its internal alliances seem to
be shifting somewhat -- the most significant shift being some separation between its two most
conservative members, Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas.
For the first time, they wound up on opposite sides of several 5-4 decisions, the most contested
cases the court decides and usually the strongest tests of judicial views.
In a pair of key decisions just before starting its summer recess Friday, the court created a
significant widening of federal civil rights protection -- against sexual harassment on the job and against
bias toward the disabled.
Having done little up to now to clear up the laws on harassment and on disability rights, the court
handed out clear-cut guidance on what companies must do to see that sexual abuse is not a daily
occurrence at work, and on the right of people with disabilities to equal treatment in jobs, housing,
medical care and prison facilities.
Often a serious disappointment to the American Civil Liberties Union, the court won that group's
qualified praise for this term. "Hopefully," said ACLU legal director Steven R. Shapiro, the term
"shows that vigorous enforcement of the nation's civil rights laws will no longer divide the court along
ideological lines."
Conservative groups also were partially satisfied, with the conservative Family Research Council,
for example, saying it was pleased with "a strong message" from the court in allowing the government
to refuse to subsidize art considered to be "indecent." But a law-and-order group, the National Victim
Center, condemned the court for cutting off school students' opportunity to sue for sexual abuse by
their teachers.
In another sign of boldness, the court appeared to stretch its powers in order to decide some key
cases not within its ordinary reach. That is "a surprising development for a conservative court" usually
devoted to deciding as little as it can, said Washington attorney Mark 1. Levy.
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One instance of that was its decision striking down a historic attempt by the two other branches of
government to help achieve balanced budgets: the law giving the president line-item veto power.
Swift decisions
Although the court regularly takes months to decide some of its most important cases, and did so
again last term, it also demonstrated that it could act swiftly if need be. It resolved in a matter of hours
what had become an international incident between the nation of Paraguay and the state of Virginia
over a death sentence for a Paraguayan convicted in that state. It ruled in Virginia's favor, forcing
Paraguay to take its grievance to the World Court in The Hague, Netherlands.
And it acted within weeks to resolve two urgent cases -- the line-item veto case, and one involving
Whitewater independent counsel Kenneth W. Starr's criminal investigation of President Clinton and
Hillary Rodham Clinton. In that case, it refused to force a lawyer for late White House aide Vincent
W. Foster Jr. to turn over notes of a private conversation that may bear upon White House scandal.
But the court declined to take swift action on the main legal contests between Starr and the president
over evidence being sought for Starr's Monica Lewinsky investigation. Those controversies, however,
seem likely to return to the court by the opening of its new term on Oct. 5.
For that term, the court has already chosen some cases to review. But returning to its recent form,
it has granted review of fewer than three dozen, with not one major constitutional controversy among
them. Some such controversies may be on the way, however: affirmative action, federal government
power to regulate smoking, gays in the military, anti-gay ballot issues, and religious freedom, as
examples.
Avoiding some disputes
When it had the chance during its past term to stay away from some major disputes, it often did so:
It passed up a test case on California's Proposition 209, dismantling affirmative action in that state, as
well as cases raising for the first time issues about prosecution of women for using drugs during
pregnancy, late-term abortion bans, gay marriage, and the famous "Megan's Law," New Jersey's pace-
setting law providing for publicly identifying convicted sex criminals living in a community.
What the court did opt to decide, though, was often significant, as shown by more than a handful
of decisions ranking as landmarks.
The court's more moderate justices, in the center philosophically, continued to dominate the results
the court reached. Two measures, among statistics about the court kept by Thomas C. Goldstein, a
Washington lawyer and adjunct law professor, illustrated the point.
Kennedy and O'Connor
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Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, who often symbolizes the power of the court's center, cast only six
dissenting votes on decided cases during the term. By contrast, the court's most liberal justice, John
Paul Stevens, cast 23, and one of its most conservative, Scalia, cast 21.
In addition, Kennedy seemed to hold most often the deciding vote when the court split 5-4, as it did
16 times. He was in the majority 13 times, the most of any justice, according to Goldstein's data.
Taking all rulings together, Kennedy agreed 60 percent of the time with Stevens and 59 percent of
the time with Scalia.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, another of the key justices in the middle, agreed with Stevens 58
percent of the time and with Scalia 62 percent of the time. That data suggested what some of the
decisions had seemed to show: O'Connor's views tended to be somewhat more conservative than
Kennedy's during this term.
For example, O'Connor dissented from the Kennedy opinion applying the Americans with
Disabilities Act to patients who test HIV-positive but have not developed symptoms of AIDS. They
also were on opposite sides of the line-item veto case, Kennedy voting to strike it down, O'Connor to
uphold it.
Scalia and Thomas
Goldstein suggested that, examining the relationships between the justices, "the most noteworthy
development" he detected was some difference in the usually close voting alignment between Scalia
and Thomas. Four times, he said, they were on opposite sides of 5-4 decisions. Thomas voted with the
majority 11 times, Scalia seven.
"Clarence Thomas is really beginning to articulate his own views, and I would not be surprised to
see him continuing to develop his own vision" about what the law is or should be, said Goldstein. "It
will take a few terms to tell."
His data noted that Scalia and Thomas agreed fully with each other 82 percent of the time, and
suggested that they remain likely to vote together "when real conservatism is on the line."
Most significant rulings
The Supreme Court closed its term on Friday after deciding 91 cases. These were the most
significant rulings:
Line-item veto: Congress acted unconstitutionally in letting the president delete specific items from
spending and tax laws (6-3 vote).
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Sexual harassment: Federal law against harassment on the job holds employer to blame if the victim
is penalized for resisting a supervisor's advances (7-2); the law applies even when harasser and victim
are of the same sex (9-0). A different federal law seldom allows students to win damages for
harassment by teachers (5-4).
Disabled individuals: Federal law protecting the disabled from discrimination applies to individuals
with IRV infection who have no symptoms yet of AIDS (5-4); the law applies to state prison inmates
(9-0).
Arts funding: The government has broad power to select the kind of art it will subsidize, and it can
choose not to finance indecent art (8-1).
Starr's investigation: A lawyer for White House counsel Vincent W Foster Jr. does not have to turn
over notes on what Foster said before his suicide about a scandal that may be linked to Hillary Rodham
Clinton (6-3).
Police chases: Police who kill or injure someone during a high-speed chase of a suspect may be sued
only rarely for damages (9-0).
Ellis Island: Most of New York harbor's historic Ellis Island, the port of entry for millions of
immigrants, lies in New Jersey, not New York (6-3).
Copyright 0 1998 by The Baltimore Sun.
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A SUPREME COURT THAT SUBURBIA COULD LOVE
The Christian Science Monitor
June 29, 1998
By Robert Marquand, Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor
At the end of the 1990s the rulings and direction of the US Supreme Court reflect, more than any
time in recent decades, an American mainstream set of views and values.
Having handed down its 91 opinions this term, including four significant rulings on sexual
harassment, the nation's top legal body is being called a "Clinton era" court: Not dominant ideology
but compromise drives decisions. The court's tone is comfortable. Rulings center on issues of economic
rights and well-being and a middle-class sense of law and order. Few extreme positions hold sway on
the right or left.
It is a court, in short, where conservative Chief Justice William Rehnquist occupied a new centrist
position, "outswinging" even Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, who has long been the crucial "swing vote"
between the moderate and conservative wings of the highest US legal body.
Unlike last year's "term of the decade," which was chockablock with hard questions such as the
right to end one's life, the term that ended Friday was quieter. The justices were more collegial and the
bulk of the rulings more technical and lawyerly. It wasn't a constitutional blockbuster.
Even the signature rulings this term - like sexual-harassment opinions that clarify laws for suing
negligent employers, or a judgment allowing "decency standards" in federal arts funding, or a ruling
that those afflicted with HIV are legally "disabled" - all interpret federal laws. These laws will affect
millions of Americans. But they don't engage lofty constitutional principles. The major constitutional
decision this year, striking down the presidential line-item veto, indicates the court's move away from
the legal reasoning of the New Deal. It reflects earlier theories that limit federal power.
Mainstreaming of court
The court's few cases on individual liberties - voting, free-speech rights, and questions of race -
seem to reflect a more mainstream approach. So does its lack of controversy. The court, for many
years, has championed individual rights. More recently, it has been marked by conservative thinking.
Yet the reasoning among justices this year was eclectic - a blend of both left and right that followed
no clear pattern.
"The decisions that define the court this year would make soccer moms happy," says Mark Tushnet
of the Georgetown University School of Law. "This court seems very much a court that respectable
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suburban Americans will like. Very middle of the road. Very Clinton."
Partly, the mainstream trend is attributed to the chief justice. In recent years the tribunal has been
labeled the "Rehnquist court" - due as much to Rehnquist's influence as to the office of chief justice.
"You see Rehnquist now becoming integrated into the mainstream of the court," argues constitutional
scholar Michael Dorf of Columbia University in New York. "He votes more often with [Justices]
Breyer, Stevens, and Souter than in the past."
Vote tallies compiled by Tom Goldstein of Boies & Schiller, a Washington law firm, shows how
much Rehnquist moved to the center this year. "He's aligning more with moderates than in the past,"
Mr. Goldstein says. "He's to the right of [Justice Anthony] Kennedy but to the left of [Justice]
O'Connor."
That Rehnquist asked the most liberal member of the court, Justice John Paul Stevens, to write the
main constitutional opinion of the year, saying no to the line-item veto on grounds of separation of
powers, is not lost on court observers. With Rehnquist joining them less often, the conservative
"revolution" of Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas is in clear decline. The two justices
increasingly seem isolated on the right, as in the twin 7-to-2 opinions on sexual harassment handed
down Friday.
Even between themselves, these two members seem in flux. Since joining the court in 1992, Justice
Thomas has never failed to join Justice Scalia in a 5-to-4 ruling. This year they disagreed four times.
Thomas, moreover, in a case denying the government a right to excessive forfeiture of funds, for the
first time wrote an opinion on the liberal side of the court - siding with Souter, Breyer, and Stevens.
Overall, the court is no longer moving in the direction Scalia, one of its most forceful and florid
members, would like. Scalia's theoretical innovation, which had great impact in the 1980s, can be
described as "textualism." Jurists are asked to look strictly at the "plain meaning" of a law or the
Constitution - and avoid the temptation to interpret text based on "what one might think was the intent
of members of Congress," as Scalia has put it.
Yet this term justices used a range of interpretive tools - history, language, purpose - to rule. For
example, the two sex cases Friday rely on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The plain language
of the act forbids discrimination, but says nothing about sexual harassment. Yet over time the meaning
of Title VII has evolved to include gender issues. "A textualist might be surprised at how much this
court is able to get out of Title VII," says Mr. Dorf.
"Rehnquist recognizes that Scalia is painting himself into a box," says David Cole of Georgetown
University, who argued the NEA case before the court. "Rehnquist wants more freedom."
One of the more important signals of the court's direction may be buried in a decision on coal
miners' medical rights, handed down in the last two days amid larger court pyrotechnics. In a
concurrence to the ruling, Justice Kennedy concluded that the law the court struck down was a
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violation of due process. He argued that private property is not subject to regulation.
Like a guns-in-schools case three years ago (Lopez), and an Indian tribal dispute two years ago
(Seminole), the rationale Kennedy employed leaps back over 60 years of court reasoning. The
repudiation of the New Deal in the Lopez and Seminole rulings was met by dissents of great anguish
and trepidation. If the Kennedy reasoning on substantive due process holds in the next few years, the
court may have turned a corner on doctrine about individual rights and federal power.
Redefining sexual harassment
Friday's two rulings on sexual harassment will have significant impact in the workplace. In one case,
a female lifeguard was harassed by a city-employee supervisor. In the other, a female employee in a
private firm was harassed by her boss, though she did not suffer a loss of promotion. The court ruled
in a new doctrine of "affirmative defense" that employers are protected from liability only if they can
show they have set up comprehensive harassment policies. Harassed employees can now sue even if
they don't suffer a "quid pro quo" loss of job or pay.
Copyright @1998 by The Christian Science Monitor.
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SUPREME COURT WEAVES LEGAL PRINCIPLES FROM
A TANGLE OF LITIGATION
The New York Times
June 30, 1998
Section A; Page 20; Column 1
By LINDA GREENHOUSE
The Supreme Court aimed for clarity and, to an unusual degree, achieved it in the term that ended
on Friday after a deluge of important rulings in the final week.
The Justices spoke forcefully in drawing a coherent rule on sexual harassment from a jumble of
confusing judicial precedents and vague Congressional language.
They established a framework for applying a Federal disability law's protections to people with
asymptomatic H.I.V. infection and other conditions that may not at first glance appear to qualify as
disabling.
They quickly put to rest Congress's experiment with the line item veto as well as the independent
counsel's effort to pierce the shield of the attorney-client privilege.
These decisions, and nearly all the others of the term's 91 rulings, were supported by clear
majorities, free of the ambiguities that often plague the Court's efforts to wrestle with highly charged
subjects.
Few Supreme Court decisions in recent memory have been received as enthusiastically across the
spectrum of interested parties as the twin sexual harassment rulings, praised by women's rights leaders,
the Chamber of Commerce and Federal trial judges alike for providing the first clear set of rules in this
rapidly evolving area of employment law.
It is also true, however, that the Court was spared this term from having to deal with disputed areas
of the law on which there is little common ground among the Justices. There were no federalism cases,
for example. The last-minute settlement of an affirmative action case from Piscataway, N.J., which had
raised the question of whether achieving diversity in the workplace could ever be a valid justification
for racial preferences, left the Court for the first time in years without a case directly confronting
questions of race.
There was also no religion case, a gap that could be filled quickly in the next term if the Justices
decide to resolve the constitutionality of publicly subsidized vouchers for parochial school tuition. For
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reasons that were not clear, there were 31 decisions involving criminal law -- more than one-third of
the docket, a much higher proportion than usual.
Of the term's 91 decisions -- up from 80 last year -- nearly half, 43, were decided by 9-to-0 votes,
unanimous in result although not always in reasoning. Fifteen cases, including several of the term's most
important, were decided by votes of 5 to 4.
These included the decision on the application of the Federal disability law to people with the virus
that causes AIDS; a ruling that, in contrast to the other sexual harassment cases, took a restrictive view
under a different Federal law of the rights of students to sue school districts for harassment by teachers;
and a decision that the interest on short-term deposits that clients leave with their lawyers is the
property of the clients, calling into question the current use of that money to help finance legal services
programs for the poor.
The key to the outcome in 5-to-4 cases was the vote of Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, who voted
in the majority in these cases and in all but 2 of the 15 in this category. Given the existing divisions on
the Court, whichever side persuaded Justice Kennedy took a giant step toward winning the case.
Most of the time, with some significant exceptions, that was the conservative side. In 35 cases that
found Justices John Paul Stevens and Antonin Scalia on opposite sides, a rough but reasonably accurate
proxy for cases with some ideological content, Justice Kennedy voted 22 times with Justice Scalia, who
along with Justice Clarence Thomas is the Court's most conservative member, and 13 times with
Justice Stevens, arguably its most liberal.
Over the entire term, Justice Kennedy cast only five dissenting votes, a remarkably small number.
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Sandra Day O'Connor tied for second in the category
of fewest dissents, with 10 each. These three essentially defined the center of the Court. The most
dissenting votes were cast by Justice Stevens, with 22, and Justice Scalia, with 19.
That Chief Justice Rehnquist, who joined the Court in 1971 and was a conservative voice in the
wilderness for perhaps the first 15 years of his tenure, could be described as occupying the center of
the Court is a measure of how the spectrum has shifted over the years.
While Justices David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer, along with Justice
Stevens, are undoubtedly the Court's liberals, there were several reminders this term of how relative
a label that is. For example, there were no dissents from an opinion by Justice Souter, in County of
Sacramento v. Lewis, holding that the police cannot be found liable for injury or death from high-speed
chases unless they acted with "a purpose to cause harm."
Some of the liveliest debates on the Court, in fact, are taking place not between liberals and
conservatives, but within the conservative bloc itself For example, the Court ruled in United States
v. Bajakajian, a 5-to-4 decision by Justice Thomas, that a Government-imposed criminal forfeiture was
unconstitutional as an "excessive fine."
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The four liberals, whose skepticism of prosecutorial authority appeared to coalesce with Justice
Thomas's solicitude for private property rights, voted in the majority. Justice Kennedy, who was joined
in dissent by Chief Justice Rehnquist and by Justices Scalia and O'Connor, objected in angry tones that
the Court was impeding the Federal Government's efforts to fight crime.
Two other decisions in criminal law cases left Justices Scalia and Thomas isolated as the only votes
to uphold prosecution positions that the other Justices appeared to regard as extreme. Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote the majority opinions in both the cases, Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal and Bousley v.
United States, granting inmates new Federal court hearings. In the Bousley case, Chief Justice
Rehnquist said there was a "significant risk" that the defendant had been wrongly convicted, while a
dissenting opinion by Justices Scalia and Thomas stressed the need for a "rule of finality."
Those two Justices also found themselves isolated in the two sexual harassment cases, decided by
7-to-2 votes on the term's final day.
These two decisions, for which the Supreme Court's 1997-98 term is likely to be best remembered,
had little to do with ideology. Rather, they drew a broad majority together in a pragmatic search for
"manageable standards," as Justice Souter put it in one of the majority opinions. Justice Thomas's
objection that the Court was engaging in "willful policy making, pure and simple" could not shake the
majority's resolve.
Here are summaries of the major rulings of the term, which began last Oct. 6 and ended June 26.
Sexual Harassment
The Court clarified the law of sexual harassment in the workplace, making some sexual harassment
suits easier for employees to win and at the same time indicating how employers can limit their legal
liability through adopting effective anti-harassment policies and complaint procedures.
The new rules came in a pair of decisions in separate cases that shared some crucial language. The
vote in both was 7 to 2, with Justices Scalia and Thomas dissenting. Justice Souter wrote the majority
opinion in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, No. 97-282, making clear that employers are responsible
for preventing and eliminating harassment in the workplace. They can be liable for even those harassing
acts of supervisory employees that violate clear policies and of which top management has no
knowledge.
In Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, No. 97-569, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy, the Court
said an employee could sue even without being able to show job-related harm, but must have availed
herself of effective complaint policies and other protection offered by the company.
In a third case, the Court expanded the category of people protected by Federal law against
workplace harassment, ruling unanimously that the law covers harassment by people of the same sex.
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What matters, Justice Scalia said in his unanimous opinion in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services,
No. 96-568, is the conduct at issue, not the sex of the people involved and not the presence or absence
of sexual desire, whether heterosexual or homosexual.
While ruling expansively in the employment cases, the Court interpreted a different law and set a
highly restrictive standard for determining when a school district can be found liable under Federal law
for a teacher's sexual harassment of a student. Voting 5 to 4, the Court said a victim can recover
damages from the school district only if an official with authority to intervene knew of the situation
and, acting with "deliberate indifference," failed to stop the harassment. Justice O'Connor wrote the
majority opinion in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, No. 96-1866, joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas.
Line Item Veto
The Line Item Veto Act of 1996, giving the President the power to cancel provisions of statutes
he has signed into law, is unconstitutional, the Court ruled, because the Constitution specifies the
exclusive means for enacting laws and does not give the President the power to cancel portions or to
amend them. The vote in Clinton v. City of New York, No. 97-1374, was 6 to 3, with Justice Stevens
writing for the majority and Justices Scalia, Breyer and O'Connor dissenting.
Evidence
The Justices rejected an effort by the Whitewater independent counsel, Kenneth W. Starr, to
persuade them to change the rules for the lawyer-client privilege after the client dies.
The privilege remains absolute, Chief Justice Rehnquist said in a 6-to-3 opinion that had the effect
of blocking Mr. Starr's effort to get notes of a conversation that the former deputy White House
counsel Vincent W. Foster Jr. had with a lawyer shortly before Mr. Foster committed suicide. Justices
O'Connor, Scalia and Thomas dissented in Swidler & Berlin v. U.S., No. 97-1192, and said there
should be a posthumous exception to the privilege for some criminal cases.
Discrimination
The Court made new law by ruling that the Americans with Disabilities Act offers protection against
discrimination to people who are infected with the virus that causes AIDS, even if they show no
symptoms of disease. The 5-to-4 majority applies the 1990 law's definition of disability, an impairment
that substantially limits a major life activity, to a woman who said she had decided never to have
children because of her H.I.V -positive status. She sued under the law when a dentist refused to treat
her in his office. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion in Bragdon v. Abbott, No. 97-156, joined
by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer.
Separately, the Court ruled unanimously that Congress intended the disability law to apply to
inmates in state prisons. Justice Scalia wrote the opinion in Pennsylvania v. Yeskey, No. 97-686.
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A splintered decision cast serious constitutional doubt on a Federal law that makes the American
citizenship of foreign-born illegitimate children dependent on whether it was their mother or their father
who was a United States citizen. If the mother is an American, the child can be deemed an American
citizen at birth. But if citizenship is claimed through an American father, that parent must acknowledge
paternity before the child turns 18. The law was challenged on equal-protection grounds by the
Philippines-born daughter of a United States serviceman who did not acknowledge paternity until the
daughter was 21.
Three Justices, Ginsburg, Breyer and Souter, found the law unconstitutional and two others,
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, suggested that it was. But the vote was nonetheless 6 to 3 to uphold
it because Justices O'Connor and Kennedy said the daughter did not have standing to challenge the law;
only the father did, they said, and he was not before the Court. The decision to uphold the law, Miller
v. Albright, No. 96-1060, was written by Justice Stevens and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist; in
addition to Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, Justices Scalia and Thomas voted with the majority on
separate grounds.
By a vote of 5 to 4, the Court rejected new, restrictive rules for an important category of civil rights
suits against public officials that would have made it easier for such suits to be dismissed before trial,
and even before pretrial discovery. Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens said that it was not the
business of judges to change the law, as the Federal appeals court here did last year when it ruled that
suits alleging that an official acted with an unconstitutional motive should be dismissed before trial
unless the plaintiff offered "clear and convincing evidence" of the official's state of mind. Justices
Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer and Souter joined the majority in Crawford-El v. Britton, No. 96-827,
which reinstated a lawsuit by a District of Columbia prison inmate claiming that officials retaliated
against him for exercising his right to free speech.
Free Speech
The Court upheld a decency test for awarding Federal arts grants, but only after a majority
interpreted the 1990 law as containing only "advisory language" that did not actually prohibit Federal
subsidies for indecent art. The vote in National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, No. 97-371, was 8
to 1, with a majority opinion by Justice O'Connor and a lone dissent by Justice Souter. Two members
of the majority, Justices Scalia and Thomas, said the law did have real teeth but was constitutional
anyway.
The Court ruled 6 to 3 that Government-owned television stations have the editorial discretion to
exclude minor-party candidates from political debates, as long as the exclusion is not based on the
candidate's views.
In his majority opinion, Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes, No. 96-779,
Justice Kennedy said a candidate debate was not a public forum, like a street corner or a park, but a
"nonpublic forum" subject to reasonable restrictions to prevent it from being overrun by unmanageable
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numbers of participants.
The case was brought by a former member of the American Nazi Party and self-described Christian
supremacist who was running for Congress in Arkansas and sought access to a debate at a state-run
public television station. Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg dissented.
Criminal Law
A suspect's fear of prosecution overseas does not require the government to honor the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination which, the Court ruled in a 7-to-2 decision by Justice
Souter that applies only in domestic criminal proceedings. Justices Ginsburg and Breyer dissented in
U.S. v. Balsys, No. 97-873. The case grew out of the refusal by a suspected Nazi collaborator from
Lithuania, in the United States for nearly 40 years, to testify in a preliminary investigation that could
lead to his deportation and prosecution in Lithuania or Israel.
The Court ruled for the first time that a criminal forfeiture sought by the Government was
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of "excessive fines." A man whose only
crime was failing to report that he was taking more than $10,000 out of the country could not be made
to forfeit the entire amount of the undeclared cash, $357,144, as provided by the reporting statute, the
Court held in a 5-to-4 decision by Justice Thomas. Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer
joined the decision, U.S. v. Bajakajian, No. 96-1487.
A 9-to-0 decision made it unlikely that the police can ever be found liable for death or injury from
high-speed chases. In an opinion by Justice Souter, the Court held that the police must have acted with
"a purpose to cause harm" for victims to be able to establish liability, negligence or recklessness is not
sufficient. The case was County of Sacramento v. Lewis, No. 96-1337.
The Court ruled, 8 to 1, that criminal defendants do not have a constitutional right to present
evidence at trial of having passed a lie-detector test. The reliability of polygraphs has not been
sufficiently established, Justice Thomas said in a majority opinion that overturned a ruling by the
highest court in the military justice system. Justice Stevens dissented in the case, United States v.
Scheffer, No. 96-1133.
The Court ruled, 5 to 4, that the exclusionary rule that bars prosecutors from introducing illegally
seized evidence at trial does not apply to parole revocation hearings. Justice Thomas wrote the opinion
in Pennsylvania Board of Probation v. Scott, No. 97-58 1.
The Court ruled, 7 to 2, that an untrue denial of guilt under questioning by a Federal investigator
can itself be prosecuted as a crime under the Federal false-statements law. Most lower Federal courts,
by contrast, had carved out an exception to the false-statements law for what was known as an
"exculpatory no," a simple, self-protective denial of guilt under questioning. But Justice Scalia, writing
for the Court in Brogan v. United States, No. 96-1579, said that there was nothing in the statute to
validate such an exception and that if the "no" was a deliberate falsehood it could be prosecuted as a
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false statement. Justices Stevens and Breyer dissented.
State Courts
In a rare interpretation of the Constitution's "full faith and credit" clause, which generally obliges
states to respect one another's legal judgments, the Court ruled 9 to 0 that notwithstanding that
obligation, one state's court system cannot bind another's to an agreement barring particular testimony
or evidence from a trial.
The case, Baker v. General Motors, No. 96-653, concerned an automobile industry whistle-blower
who had agreed in a Michigan court settlement with the General Motors Corporation not to testify
against the company as an expert witness. He was then subpoenaed by plaintiffs in a case against G.M.
in Missouri. The Federal appeals court there barred the testimony on the basis of the Michigan court
order. In her opinion overturning that ruling, Justice Ginsburg said Michigan lacked the authority to
limit other states' courts in their "search for the truth."
Business
In one of its most important antitrust rulings in years, the Court ruled unanimously that
manufacturers can set ceilings on retail markups without necessarily violating the Sherman Antitrust
Act. Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court overruled a 1968 precedent that had labeled as illegal
price-fixing the practice known as resale price maintenance.
Justice O'Connor said that the earlier decision was based on bad economics and that limiting the
price a retailer can charge can be good for consumers as well as good for the manufacturer's business.
Under the new decision, State Oil v. Khan, No. 96-871, which began as a dispute between a gasoline
supplier and a retail dealer, the legality of price ceilings will be based on a case-by-case analysis of the
effect on competition.
By a 5-to-4 vote, the Court handed the banking industry an important victory in its battle against
credit unions for the consumer banking dollar. The Court invalidated a 1982 Federal regulation that
had permitted credit unions to expand far beyond their traditional base in tightly defined employee or
community groups. The regulation did not properly interpret a 1934 Federal law that limited credit
union membership to groups having a "common bond," Justice Thomas said in his opinion, National
Credit Union Administration v. First National Bank & Trust Co., No. 96-843. Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Scalia also voted in the majority.
A unanimous opinion virtually insured the continued flourishing of the multibillion-dollar "gray
market" in unauthorized imports. The Court ruled that copyright law is of no use to a manufacturer
seeking to block the domestic resale of American-made goods initially distributed overseas, because
once a "first sale" has taken place, the copyright owner has no further control over a product's fate.
Justice Stevens wrote the opinion, Quality King Distributors v. L'Anza Research International, No. 96-
1470.
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In an important interpretation of the Federal Superfund law on environmental cleanups, the Court
ruled unanimously that corporations cannot ordinarily be held responsible for cleaning up the pollution
caused by activities of their subsidiaries. The Court said in an opinion by Justice Souter, however, that
the parent corporation can be liable if it has directly operated, as opposed to merely supervised, the
subsidiary's facility. The case was United States v. Bestfoods, No. 97-454.
Property
The Court ruled 5 to 4 that interest on the money that clients leave on deposit for short periods with
their lawyers is the property of the clients. While this was only a preliminary ruling, it cast in doubt the
future of a program, adopted by all 50 states, that generates some $100 million a year for legal services
for the poor from the interest on pooled small client accounts.
By definition, the individual deposits would be too small to earn net interest after the expenses of
setting up the accounts under the program known as Interest on Lawyers Trust Accounts, or lolta.
Nonetheless, Chief Justice Rehnquist said in his majority opinion, "interest follows principal," and the
interest must be considered the clients' property even if, as a practical matter, no interest would
otherwise exist. Now the lower courts must decide whether the programs amount to an
unconstitutional "taking" of the private property. Justices Scalia, Thomas, O'Connor and Kennedy
joined the majority opinion, Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation, No. 96-1578.
The Court struck down a 1992 law that required companies previously in the coal mining business
to assume retroactive liability for health benefits for miners and their families. A plurality of four
Justices, in an opinion by Justice O'Connor, said the Coal Act amounted to an unconstitutional taking
of the companies' property. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas joined that opinion.
Justice Kennedy provided a fifth vote to declare the law unconstitutional on due process grounds. The
case was Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, No. 97-42.
Boundaries
In the long-running battle of Ellis Island, the Court awarded victory to New Jersey over New York
by a vote of 6 to 3. All the landfilled portion, or roughly 90 percent of the island through which some
12 million immigrants passed from 1892 to 1954, is New Jersey territory under the terms of an 1934
interstate compact, Justice Souter said in his majority opinion. Justices Stevens, Scalia, and Thomas
dissented. The decision, New Jersey v. New York, No. 120 original, will have little practical effect
because the National Park Service runs the historic sites on the 27-acre island, but the psychological
impact appears to have been considerable.
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"TOP 10 RULINGS"
The biggest cases from this Supreme Court term.
The New York Times Graphic
June 30, 1998
By LINDA GREENHOUSE
LINE-ITEM VETO
President Clinton v. City of New York: Congress cannot give the President the power to cancel
provisions of bills he has signed into law, Line Item Veto Act of 1996 is unconstitutional.
H.I.V DISCRIMINATION
Bragdon v. Abbott: The Americans with Disabilities Act can bar discrimination against people infected
with the virus that causes AIDS.
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
Swidler & Berlin v. United States: The attorney-client privilege survives the death of the client.
FORFEITURE
United States v. Bajakajian: The Government cannot impose a criminal forfeiture that is grossly
disproportionate to the offense for which the property's owner is being punished.
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton and Burlington Industries v. Ellerth: Same vote in both decisions.
Law on sexual harassment in the workplace is clarified and strengthened.
SAME-SEX HARASSMENT
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services: Federal law protects people from being sexually harassed on
the job by others of the same sex.
STUDENT HARASSMENT
Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District: Schools are not liable for a teacher's sexual
harassment of a student unless officials actually knew of the problem and refused to intervene.
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FEDERAL ARTS FUNDING
National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley: The law requiring the N.E.A. to take decency into account
when making grants to artists does not violate the First Amendment.
ELLIS ISLAND
New Jersey v. New York: Nearly all the historic island is under the jurisdiction of New Jersey, not New
York.
PRIVATE PROPERTY
Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation: Interest on small, temporary deposits that clients leave with
their lawyers is the property of the clients.
Copyright 0 1998 by The New York Times.
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THIS TERM, SUPREME COURT RULED TO THE NATION'S BEAT
The Washington Post
June 28, 1998; Pg. Al
By Joan Biskupic, Washington Post Staff Writer
They are secluded in a place that's been called the Marble Palace and conceal their personalities beneath
black robes. They rely on stacks of paper to interpret the human dilemmas before them and reach all their
conclusions in private, ornate chambers.
Yet to a degree rare in recent history, the Supreme Court justices this term considered the rhythm and
dramas of ordinary people -- and handed down decisions that could affect them significantly.
The justices put themselves in the place of the rank and file on the job. They saw the vulnerability of
people who confide in family lawyers. They stepped into the shoes of cops chasing a fleeing suspect. And
in one of the most important cases of the term that ended in a spree of decisions last week, they considered
what it's like to live -- and die -- with the AIDS virus.
In many of the 91 rulings produced since the justices convened on the first Monday in October, the
majority searched out a middle ground. They were practical. They asked what a reasonable person would
think. And in what has come to be a hallmark of this moderate-to-conservative court, the justices captured
a societal consensus. It was as if they looked out at the range of American beliefs and drew a circle around
the center.
Sexual harassment is too common a problem, the court said, and no one should have to put up with it.
But employers need not punish harmless flirtations. Whatever the justices may think of gays and drug users,
they made clear that the AIDS virus that has come to be associated with those groups ought to be treated like
any other disease. The justices acknowledged the public's concem over sexually explicit or offensive material
and said, with only one of their brethren dissenting, that the federal government can consider standards of
decency and respect for American values in deciding which art to fund.
While this term failed to match the momentous sweep of cases from the previous year, including
physician-assisted suicide and Internet pornography, the recently completed session offered no less occasion
for the justices to intersect with American life. It showed once again how, as Congress works incrementally
and often without consequence, the justices are moving with forceful strokes in laying out the law of the land.
The pragmatic character of the court has emerged over the years, extending back to its 1992 decision
upholding a woman's right to abortion but with some restrictions, and including last term's rulings against
a right to physician-assisted suicide for the terminally ill but leaving open such a right in the future. Those
decisions, pollsters and commentators found, tapped into majority consensus.
"This is a nuanced, subtle court that . .. splits the difference and avoids drawing bright lines," Stanford
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University law professor Kathleen M. Sullivan said yesterday.
The approach, embodied mostly in the voices of Justices Anthony M. Kennedy and Sandra Day
O'Connor, flows from a judicial belief that the court's central task is to interpret law, not create it. The
justices generally read the Constitution narrowly and look for exactly what Congress had in mind when it
passed a law. The majority is not about to breathe into a statute what Congress failed to insert.
That thrust contrasts with the liberal era of the '60s and '70s when the court spoke most eloquently on
behalf of racial minorities, the poor and the disadvantaged. Bygonejurists such as Chief Justice Earl Warren
and Justices William J. Brennan Jr. and Thurgood Marshall believed that judges should find the essential
meaning of the law not only in the text of the Constitution or statutes but in the broader needs of
contemporary America Rather than define where the nation was, they pushed and provoked so it would end
up where they thought it ought to be.
If anything, this court catches up to where America already is. Rather than offering eloquently rendered,
broad-reaching principles, today's majority carefully parses the law in hopes of reflecting society's norms.
O'Connor and Kennedy, 1981 and 1988 appointees of Ronald Reagan, most typify the pragmatic, case-
by-case approach. And it is these two justices who most often find themselves in the majority, and for that
reason have come to define the court's center. As a broad philosophy, they adopt federalist principles,
believing that Congress should stay out of affairs that ought to be the states'.
Of much the same mind but further to the right are Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices
Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas. Rehnquist was appointed by Richard M. Nixon in 1971 and elevated
to chief by Reagan in 1986. Scalia was appointed by Reagan in 1986 and Thomas by George Bush in 1991.
The "liberal wing," such as it is, comprises Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer. Stevens, the eldest Justice, completed his 23rd year on the bench after
being named by Gerald R. Ford. Souter is a 1990 Bush appointee and Ginsburg and Breyer were named by
President Clinton in 1993 and 1994, respectively.
That 5 to 4 split yielded some controversial outcomes, but in many of the most closely watched cases of
the term, the ideological groupings dissolved.
The court delved into the harassing behavior that has become commonplace in many workplaces. "Sexual
harassment by supervisors (and, for that matter, co-employees) is a persistent problem," Souter wrote for
the court in one of two 7 to 2 rulings on the topic. (Only Scalia and Thomas dissented.)
In the opinions by Souter and Kennedy on the last day of the term, the court said employers can be held
liable for the misconduct of their supervisors even if they didn't know it was taking place. They said that, by
now, every employer should know harassment occurs and take steps to prevent it.
Earlier in the term the justices took on an emerging workplace question: whether harassment can be
considered illegal sex discrimination if the harasser and victim are of the same sex. The justices ruled yes,
unanimously.
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In that case, Scalia explained why it is important to examine the social context of the harassment: "A
professional football player's working environment is not severely or pervasively abusive, for example, if the
coach smacks him on the buttocks as he heads onto the field -- even if the same behavior would reasonably
be experienced as abusive by the coach's secretary (male or female) back at the office."
Scalia said the "ordinary socializing in the workplace -- such as male-on-male horseplay or intersexual
flirtation" should not be mistaken for discriminatory harassment that unlawfully affects job conditions.
The court's decisions on sexual harassment in the workplace, particularly the two on employer liability
last week, made it easier for employees to sue for harassment but also gave employers ways to avoid liability,
largely by preventing vulgar remarks, unwanted advances and other harassment in the first place.
That solution was typical of the court's attempt to find balance in situations that defy easy answers.
"It is a welcome change from previous years when the court and Congress often seemed at war over civil
rights laws," said Steven R. Shapiro, the American Civil Liberties Union's national legal director.
But the fourth harassment ruling was not greeted with such warmth by civil rights advocates. The court,
split along its usual 5 to 4 divide, held that a student may sue a school district for damages only if the district
knew of the harassment and was deliberately indifferent to it.
Critics said it defied common sense for the court to set tougher standards to protect adults against sexual
harassment while refusing to safeguard harassed students in the same way.
The reason traces back to the justices' careful reading of the laws they had to work with, and their
unwillingness to push beyond what those laws state. As O'Connor explained, the federal statutes governing
harassment on the job and at school are different. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is an outright
prohibition on sex discrimination and harassment on the job, while Title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972 is based on a presumption that schools that receive federal funds will first be notified of
discrimination problems and allowed to correct them before being held financially liable.
"No one questions that a student suffers extraordinary harm when subjected to sexual harassment and
abuse by a teacher, and that the teacher's conduct is reprehensible," O'Connor wrote. But she said it is up to
Congress to specifically write a law that holds a school district liable in damages for a teacher's harassment
of a student even if it didn't know about it.
Kennedy and the rest of the conservative bloc signed O'Connor's opinion. But three days later Kennedy
proved the crucial vote in another case, joining the more liberal members in ruling that federal disabilities
law covers people with the virus that causes AIDS.
Examining the language of the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act and its history, Kennedy said the
law must cover people who have HIV even if they have no outward symptoms. He offered a clinical but
chilling rendition of the virus's phases and intimated a compassion for its victims that would have been
unlikely a decade ago.
"The virus concentrates in the blood. The assault on the immune system is immediate. The victim suffers
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from a sudden and serious decline in the number of white blood cells," Kennedy wrote.
In a separate case that had been closely followed by advocates for the terminally ill and elderly, the court
ruled that the attorney-client privilege, which keeps conversations between the two confidential, does not
dissolve when the client dies.
"Many attorneys act as counselors on personal and family matters," Rehnquist wrote in the opinion that
examined the myriad reasons an average person would confide in a lawyer. "These confidences may not
come close to any sort of admission of criminal wrongdoing, but nonetheless be matters which the client
would not wish divulged."
The justices rejected an effort by Whitewater independent counsel Kenneth W Starr to obtain the notes
of a conversation former White House counsel Vincent W. Foster Jr. had with his lawyer before Foster
committed suicide.
In the Foster case, the justices refused to balance the needs of a prosecutor against those of private
individuals. But in many other criminal law cases, this court opens its analysis by weighing the state's
interests against individual citizens.
Mostly, this court has strengthened the hand of prosecutors and police -- as it did when the justices put
themselves in the place of police officers engaged in a high-speed chase.
The justices considered the "split-second judgments" that must be made in "tense, uncertain and rapidly
evolving" circumstances as they adopted a tough standard for the innocent crash victims who want to hold
police liable under civil rights law.
With the close of this term, these nine justices have been together for four years, ever since Breyer joined
the bench as Harry A. Blackmun's successor in 1994. And they seem to have reached an equilibrium. They
ended their session on a day in June that was the earliest in a decade.
As for the boldness of their convictions, they bear little resemblance to the liberalism of the '60s and '70s
and are discemably more moderate than the distinctly conservative terms near the beginning of the decade.
But the court is making a significant imprint on American lives and striving, as former Justice Robert H.
Jackson said a half-century ago, "to maintain the great system of balances upon which our free government
is based."
THE SUPREME COURT MAKES ITS MARK
Following are among the major cases of the Supreme Court's 1997-98 term, which ended Friday:
Sexual Harassment
* Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 7-2. An employer can be held liable
for its supervisors' sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, even if it did not know
of the misconduct, in some cases, the employer can defend itself by showing it took steps to prevent or
correct harassment.
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* Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, 9-0. Federal law against sexual harassment on the job covers
misconduct even when the victim and the harasser are the same sex.
* Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 5-4. A student may sue a school district for a
teacher's sexual harassment under Title IX of federal education law only if the district actually knew of the
harassment and was deliberately indifferent to it.
Government and Society
* Clinton v. City of New York, 6-3. The president's line-item veto authority is not constitutional, he
cannot cancel specific projects contained in broad spending bills.
* Bragdon v. Abbott, 5-4. HIV-infected people are protected by a federal ban on discrimination against
the disabled even if they suffer no obvious symptoms of AIDS.
* Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v. Yeskey, 9-0. State prisoners are covered by a federal
disabilities law.
Free Speech
* Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes, 6-3. Public television stations have the right
to choose which political candidates appear in their televised debates and may exclude third-party candidates
without violating the First Amendment.
* National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 8-1. The federal govemment can consider general standards
of decency in deciding which arts projects to fund.
The Law and Business
* Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 6-3. The attorney-client privilege, which keeps communications
between the two confidential, does not end when a client dies.
* Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation, 5-4. The interest on trust funds that lawyers hold for clients
is the private property of the clients. The ruling could endangers state legal aid funding for the poor that
channels that interest.
* National Credit Union Administration v. First National Bank & Trust, 5-4. Individual credit unions
cannot broadly draw from members in a variety of occupations. Federally chartered credit unions cannot
enroll millions of workers in different companies and locations.
* Oubre v. Entergy Operations, 6-3. Older workers who are pressured to quit and obtain a severance
payment in return for a promise not to sue may still be able to bring a claim for age discrimination if the
waivers signed failed to meet the disclosure requirements of federal law.
* General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 9-0. Trial judges have great discretion to decide what type of scientific
testimony can be presented to juries, and appeals courts must give the trial judge's decision to exclude or
admit "expert" testimony great deference.
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Crime
* United States v. Scheffer, 8-1. State and federal government may ban the use of polygraph evidence
at trial because doubts and uncertainties remain about the accuracy of lie-detector tests.
* United States v. Bajakajian, 5-4. Federal fines and forfeitures cannot be grossly disproportional to the
gravity of the offense; the court said the government cannot seize and keep the money of a person trying to
carry funds out of the country simply because he did not properly report the money.
* Hudson v. United States, 9-0. The Constitution's double jeopardy clause does not bar the criminal
prosecution of people who have already been forced to pay civil fines for regulatory wrongdoing.
Miscellaneous
* New Jersey v. New York, 6-3. The historic Ellis Island belongs mostly to New Jersey, not to New York,
based on an agreement the two states signed in 1834.
Copyright @1998 by The Washington Post.
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NINE SUPREME INDIVIDUALISTS: A GUIDE TO THE CONVERSATION
The Washington Post
April 28, 1998; Pg. A15
By Joan Biskupic, Washington Post Staff Writer
The way their mahogany bench rises up at the front of the marble courtroom, the Supreme Court
justices appear as nine heads atop black robes, shaking and nodding, leaning forward, drawing back.
While they speak collectively as "the Court" when they write decisions, during oral arguments they
are their most individual selves: nine people having a conversation, revealing their interests and
personalities, quirks and manners.
It is the most public part of their work, and this week marks the last regular session of oral
arguments for the current term. Although a visitor might be confused about who's who in black, you
can know them by their remarks.
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist
In his 26th year on the bench and nearing his 12th term as chief, Rehnquist is a demanding
questioner who is nonetheless prone to humor and the kind of quirky independence that led him to put
gold stripes on the sleeves of his robe. A native of suburban Milwaukee, Rehnquist, 73, often uses
quaint phrases. He told one lawyer who was awkwardly offering a legal standard, "That sounds like
running around Robin Hood's barn." (Robin Hood did not have a barn, of course, and the expression
means to wander about looking for something that isn't in Sherwood Forest, or elsewhere.)
But mostly, Rehnquist can cut a lawyer down to size. When one tried to argue that the court should
pay attention to what state legislatures were doing in a particular area, Rehnquist admonished, "We
don't ordinarily say when we're trying to interpret a provision of the Constitution ... 'Let's hear what
the people have to say about it."' When a lawyer declared with some flourish that he had said all he
wanted to say before his time had expired, Rehnquist quipped that he was luckier than most.
Justice John Paul Stevens
At 78, the silver-haired Stevens is the oldest justice, and more deferential than the others. He tends
to lay back at the rough-and-tumble start of a session and then preface his question with an apology
of sorts. "I'm puzzled about your response," he'll begin. During a recent copyright case, he said,
"Maybe I'll reveal my ignorance. ... But I just want to be sure I understand ..."
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In written opinions, the bow-tied Stevens is one of the more intellectual justices, and he often
separates himself from his colleagues with his distinct reasoning. But during arguments, the Chicago
native is preoccupied by the practicalities of a case. How exactly does the law work?
The polite justice who's been on the bench since 1975 is no pushover, however. A former clerk who
later argued before him once said, "As he begins to ask his question, you can hear the saw going into
the floor around you."
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
The court's first female justice is a vigorous questioner, often jumping in before the lawyer at the
lectern gets much further than the traditional opening of, "May it please the Court ..." A stickler for
procedure, O'Connor, who is 68 and has been on the bench since 1981, will home in on flaws in a case
that might stop the court from having to resolve the constitutional dilemma at its heart.
Born in El Paso to a pioneering family, O'Connor cannot abide prattle and often admonishes a
wavering lawyer to "just answer 'yes' or 'no.'
She punctuates every other word, and her voice is often tinged with exasperation: "Don't you think
every employee in the country knows that if they're mistreated, they can complain to somebody higher
up the ladder?" she asked during a sexual harassment case. "I mean, it's not like everybody is totally
ignorant of these situations."
Justice Antonin Scalia
A man of a hundred hypotheticals. In a recent case involving California's claim to a sunken 19th-
century ship, Scalia offered the scenario: "Suppose I drop a silver dollar down a grate, and I try to
bring it up with a piece of gum on a stick, and I can't do it, and I shrug my shoulders and walk off
because I have not gotten it, and then somebody comes up and lifts up the grate and gets my silver
dollar. Is that his silver dollar? Have I abandoned it just because I could not get it?"
Scalia, 62 and a 1986 appointee, also is known for his unrestrained sarcasm. After he spun a
hypothetical question last week, and the lawyer responded that that wasn't the case before the court,
Scalia said, "No!" And he added mockingly that of course he knew it wasn't part of the case.
But the New Jersey native has an amazing sense of timing. He will crack a joke laden with legal
jargon and still get lots of laughs.
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy
On the court for 10 years now, Kennedy actually seems to want to know the answers to the
questions he asks. It's rare that he will use oral arguments to telegraph his views to other justices or
simply argue a point.
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A native of Sacramento, Kennedy, 61, leans forward in his big black leather chair, looking earnest
and sometimes befuddled. To one lawyer, he said, "I think that would be a very dangerous rule. ... I
have concerns about that rule. ... Do you have concerns about that rule?"
Kennedy is the key vote on many of the biggest cases, partly because he isn't as dug-in and as
certain as some of his colleagues.
Justice David H. Souter
A persistent questioner, Souter poses his queries in paragraphs, logically linking the law's rules and
consequences in his distinctive Yankee drawl. He focuses on history and court precedent. Souter, 58,
grew up in Weare, N.H., and lived there, except while at college, until 1990, when he was named to
the court.
And as with Stevens, Souter's manners are on display. "Have you finished your answer to Justice
O'Connor?" he asked in a recent case before posing his own question. He likes to zero in on what the
precise rule of law should be.
Sitting elbow to elbow with Scalia, Souter is sometimes a foil to him. Once, in a case about whether
police should be able to order passengers out of a stopped car, as Scalia joked about passengers who
desperately want to get out because the hypothetical driver had been speeding, Souter quipped, "You
can see what Justice Scalia's passengers tend to feel like."
Justice Clarence Thomas
Although Thomas is generally quiet during oral arguments, it's not that the 1991 appointee doesn't
have provocative things to say. Just last week, he opened a dissenting opinion in a case about jury
selection by saying, "I fail to understand how the rights of blacks excluded from jury service can be
vindicated by letting a white murderer go free."
But Thomas does not say such things, or much else, from the bench. The native of Pin Point, Ga.,
rarely asks a question, and when he does, it is in the more obscure cases.
He has told some friends that he thinks the hour of oral arguments should be a platform for what
the lawyers, not the justices, have to say.
So Thomas, 49, rocks in his chair, looks at the ceiling, occasionally reaches for a drink from his
silver tumbler and keeps his thoughts to himself
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg
This justice, in contrast, sits at attention and focuses hard on the lawyer at the lectern. Ginsburg,
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65, will often pound away at the same issue.
And she is to the point: "Why is there an exception here?" "How did this happen?" She expects
precision in response. To one advocate, she said recently, "I'm sort of fuzzy about" the lawyer's answer.
"On the one hand, you give [a particular view], but then it kind of drifts off into the wind."
Born in Brooklyn, Ginsburg was appointed to the court in 1993. A fierce opponent of gender
stereotyping, she objects to assumptions about men as much as about women. During a sexual
harassment case involving a man who had been abused by other men on an offshore oil rig, she
disparaged tormentors who, hypothetically speaking, might say, "You're not the right kind of male."
Justice Stephen G. Breyer
A longtime law professor, Breyer asks questions in carefully numbered paragraphs and sometimes
includes so much of his own summing-up that he has to declare at the end: "That was a question." As
he gestures in the air, he looks like he could use a chart to make his point.
Breyer, 59, worries aloud about the law's dilemmas. He'll take off his glasses, rub his head and say,
"I'm just trying to understand this." To one lawyer, he recently observed that "you've now put your
finger on just the point that's bothering me."
But Breyer, who was born in San Francisco and joined the court in 1994, is an easygoing justice
who backs off when a lawyer is foundering. "I grant you, it's hard to work out," he told one lawyer
struggling to make a clear point.
Copyright 01998 by the Washington Post.
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KENNEDY'S VOTE KEY IN CLOSE CASES
The San Diego Union-Tribune
(Associated Press)
June 28, 1998
WASHINGTON -- If the Supreme Court's 1997-98 term were measured as an earthquake, Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy would be its epicenter.
Kennedy dissented from only six of the term's 91 signed decisions, fewer than any of his eight
colleagues.
In his 10 years on the court, the unassuming, generally conservative Californian often has found
himself right in the middle of things. And there is power in the middle.
In the just-completed term's most divisive cases -- the 15 resulting in 5-4 splits -- Kennedy was with
the majority in 13.
"He retains his status as a valuable utility infielder capable of going in either direction," said
Pepperdine University law professor Douglas Kmiec. Statistics confirm what court watchers have
known for years: Kennedy and Justice Sandra Day O'Connor are key votes when the court divides into
ideological or even jurisprudential blocs. O'Connor logged 10 dissents. What about Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist? The man who early in his 26-year court tenure was called the "lone ranger" for
his isolation on the right also cast just 10 dissenting votes. Some legal experts think Rehnquist's
conservatism sometimes takes a back seat to his effort to forge consensus.
Such motivations rarely have been ascribed to the term's two most prolific dissenters. Justice John
Paul Stevens, now considered the court's most liberal member, had 23, and the solidly conservative
Justice Antonin Scalia had 21.
Dissent totals for other justices: Stephen G. Breyer, 13; David Souter, 15, Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
16; and Clarence Thomas, 17.
As usual, Stevens and Scalia were the court's most prolific authors. Scalia wrote 10 opinions for
the court, 10 concurrences and 13 dissents, 33 total. Stevens was right behind with 32 opinions- eight
for the court, nine concurrences and 15 dissents.
The 91 signed decisions marked the first time in five years the total topped 90. The highest total this
decade was the 129 rulings in the 1989-90 term. The lowest was 75 in 1995-96.
Copyright @1998 The San Diego Union-Tribune.
52
HIGH COURT'S COLORFUL MAN IN BLACK- JUSTICE SCALIA
Christian Science Monitor
March 3, 1998
By Robert Marquand, Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor
In the cramped US Supreme Court press gallery, the view is so obstructed that an officer holds up cards
to indicate which justice is speaking. With seven men on the bench, it's easy to confuse the softer tones of
Justices John Paul Stevens, Anthony Kennedy, and Stephen Breyer.
But one voice is unmistakable. Its penetrating pitch cows lawyers, and it can range from a controlled
explosion to a dancing light-hearted mockery. That's Justice Antonin Scalia - no need to look at the card.
Articulate and fiery, Justice Scalia stood out from the start. From forcefully written conservative decisions
to gloves-off verbal jousting, from his philosophy of law to his sporty role as bon vivant on the Washington
social scene, Scalia makes waves. He may not be the most politic or influential vote-getter on the bench. Yet
since joining the nation's highest legal body 13 years ago, Scalia has overseen - some say singlehandedly -
a basic shift in the court's underlying approach to law and the Constitution.
Certainly he is one of the most colorful of the nine court members. No other justices have one, let alone
two, Web sites set up by admirers. Some conservatives talk about "Nino," as he's known to friends, as a
future United States president. (Scalia says no.)
Moreover, Scalia has stayed in the news, even if the Supreme Court, with its lightest term in years, hasn't.
He is cited around town for his lone dissent in the 1988 case that upheld the independent-counsel law, in the
Iran-contra investigation. With Kenneth Starr's investigation of the White House now front and center,
Scalia's dissent, which raises the likelihood of partisan abuse by a prosecutor, is being passed around like
manna in Democratic circles.
Some court observes expected that Scalia, with his academic brilliance and government experience,
would be another William Brennan, a skillful consensus-builder for his cause. Yet his combative style and
hard-edged legal theories have alienated him from court centrists such as Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and
Anthony Kennedy. Papers of the late Justice Thurgood Marshall show Scalia's sarcasm could annoy even
affable Chief Justice William Rehnquist, a fellow conservative.
Instead, Scalia's impact has been on the way the court approaches constitutional law itself By adhering
to methods he calls "originalism" and "textualism," Scalia has prompted the justices to be more self-
conscious about how they interpret law. Rather than following judicial interpretation of law, originalists go
directly to the source - to the language of the Constitution of 1791, or to the post-Civil War 14th Amendment
in 1868 that forbade discrimination.
"Scalia is at the heart of a major shift on the court in how cases are presented and how legislative history
is understood," says Michael Dorf of Columbia University in New York. "We used to start with history in
thinking about interpreting law, now we start with language."
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This shift is apparent on both the liberal and conservative sides of the bench. "We are all originalists
now," says liberal scholar Ronald Dworkin, who differs with Scalia not on methods but on how they are
applied.
Before the mid-1980s, the justices did not often hang their decisions on a theoretical legal framework.
"Before Scalia, until the late '80s, the justices would issue a ruling and say, 'Here is why our opinion makes
sense,' and then support it with some law and history," says Mark Tushnet of the Georgetown University Law
School and a former clerk for Justice Thurgood Marshall. "But now everyone is much more conscious about
looking at what the text [of the Constitution] says - and quite often less conscious about how that might fit
into a social or practical context."
"Words do have a limited range of meaning, and no interpretation that goes beyond that range is
permissible," Scalia stated in a lecture at Princeton University in New Jersey three years ago.
A good example was Scalia's opinion last year in the Brady handgun case, an important ruling in that it
continued to shift power from Washington to the states. The question was whether local or state police could
be required to enforce a federal policy about checking the background of people buying firearms. A 5-to-4
majority said they did not have to.
Writing for the court, Scalia argued that the plain text of the Constitution sets out an equal separation of
powers between states and the federal government. The opinion bypassed the history of federal-state
relations as ruled on by the court over time. Scalia rejected any "balancing analysis" that would give more
weight to federal than state government. That isn't in the framework of the Constitution, he argued.
Another example is Scalia's blistering dissent in the 1992 Casey decision, which upheld a woman's right
to choose abortion and turned back Pennsylvania's effort to curb that right. Scalia argued that because the
Constitution says nothing about protecting abortion rights, the court cannot override the will of the people
to restrict that practice.
Scalia, the father of nine, is himself an only child. His father was an Italian immigrant who became a
professor of Romance languages at Brooklyn College in New York, his mother, an Italian-American, taught
public school.
Scalia graduated magna cum laude from Harvard Law School in 1960 and went on to a series of jobs in
private and public life. He worked for a Cleveland law firm, returned to the groves of academe at the
University of Virginia, then packed off for six years as an assistant attorney general in the Nixon and Ford
administrations. When President Reagan nominated him in 1982 to serve on the US Court of Appeals, Scalia
was camped out at the University of Chicago. He joined the high court in 1986, becoming the first Italian-
American justice.
Scalia is a devout Roman Catholic, which some court observers say informs, at least in part, some of his
views. The Scalias worship at a suburban Virginia church known for its orthodox-minded congregation, one
that recently erected a monument to unborn children.
In 1996, when the high court had accepted two important "right to die" cases dealing with the practice
of euthanasia, Scalia came under fire for giving a speech- while the case was still before the court- in which
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he said there is "no constitutional right to die."
A year earlier, in a speech at the Mississippi College of Law, Scalia waded into the conservative side of
the culture wars over religion in the public arena, coming out for a greater presence of religion and
infuriating church-state separationists. He attacked "elites" and others whom he sees as hostile to faith,
stating, "We must pray for the courage to endure the scorn of the sophisticated world."
Many scholars and ministers view Scalia's religious bent with some irony. From the point of view of most
denominations in the US, Scalia is the one who engineered the Smith decision, which is considered to be the
most regressive Supreme Court ruling ever on American religious liberty. The 1990 opinion, which he wrote,
allowed the state of Oregon to prohibit native Americans from using peyote in religious ceremonies. But its
sweep was broader: The opinion also eliminated legal protections for the religious exercise of minority faiths,
while keeping intact majority rights.
The Smith ruling brought together a religious coalition of more than 80 faiths that, in turn, worked with
Congress to reinstate the protections. But the high court struck down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
last June.
Currently, Washington is abuzz over Scalia's 1988 dissent on independent counsels. Congress passed the
law creating the office after Watergate, in an effort to hold the executive branch more accountable. For years,
federal courts backed the right of the executive branch to investigate itself But after President Nixon fired
special prosecutor Archibald Cox during Watergate, that view came to be seen as folly.
Scalia, however, sees a danger in independent counsels who are not necessarily neutral actors but may
be motivated by political passion. He argues that "picking the man" and then searching for a crime reverses
the proper notion of justice. "The independent counsel was formed in an era when 'regulation' was thought
to be something scientific," says a former Scalia law clerk. "Nino said 'No!' These are political entities."
Supporters of the law say that it may be flawed but that oversight on crimes in high places is needed, they
also note that Lawrence Walsh, the Iran-contra investigator, was a conservative Republican.
For the most part, Scalia is a happy warrior. He usually votes with Justice Clarence Thomas and Chief
Justice Rehnquist on the right. He plays the intellectual outsider crying in the wilderness, but does so with
a.wink and a smile- perhaps because his theories have partly carried the day in the areas of federalism,
individual rights, and the First Amendment.
In recent years, Scalia has set out his ideas about judges who, in his view, make law on the basis of
personal bias. He dates that practice to the English common-law era, when judges made law to fit practical
needs, and he says it continues today in the nation's law schools.
"What intellectual fun all of this is! It explains why first-year law school is so exhilarating: It consists of
playing common-law judge, which in turn consists of playing king- devising, out of the brilliance of one's
own mind, those laws that ought to govern mankind." Scalia writes with undisguised sarcasm in "A Matter
of Interpretation," a 1995 book.
Scalia's critics are diverse and numerous. Their basic complaint is that his oniginalist ideas tend to freeze
the Constitution in time rather than allow it to speak to contemporary needs. Scalia himself has referred to
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the founding document as "a statue."
Some Scalia critics also see inconsistencies in the justice's application of originalism. When it comes to
abortion, which he opposes, Scalia is among the first to note that there's nothing in the Constitution explicitly
supporting that right. Yet when it comes to states' rights, which he has sought to broaden, Scalia treats the
10th Amendment as if it gives states power to ignore congressional requests to comply with federal
regulations- even though the Constitution gives no affirmative rights to states, critics say.
"States' rights, executive privilege, qualified immunity, all the things Scalia seems to support, are part and
parcel of the judge-made law he says he doesn't agree with," gripes a constitutional lawyer who has a case
before the court.
"Scalia seems to feel that original interpretation is everything," says Georgetown University's Dr. Tushnet.
"He exalts text and history above practical issues, like how a ruling affects the machinery of government in
the real world. That's a concern he doesn't seem to have."
Yet in some cases, like the one to criminalize the buming of the American flag, Scalia does not side with
the patriotic or traditional camp. He argues that dissent is an American trait. Notes a former Scalia law clerk:
"He doesn't always vote the way a conservative Republican would want. He can be brought to see and do
the principled thing, even when his instincts run contrary."
IN JUSTICE SCALIA'S OWN WORDS:
'The enemies of single-sex education have won, by persuading only seven Justices ... that their view of
the world is enshrined in the Constitution, they have effectively imposed that view on all 50 states.'
-Dissenting from the court's 7-to-1 decision that forced the Virginia Military Institute to admit
women, 1996
'Leaving [religious] accommodation to the political process will place at a relative disadvantage those
religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of democratic
government must be preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself...'
-Writing for the court in a ruling that allows states to forbid native Americans from using peyote
for religious purposes, 1990
'It is no more compatible with [states'] independence and autonomy that their [police] officers be
dragooned into administering federal law than it would be compatible with the independence and autonomy
of the United States that its officers be impressed into service for the execution of state laws.'
-Writing for the majority in a ruling invalidating a US request that local sheriffs check the
backgrounds of gun buyers, 1997
THE MAN BEHIND THE ROBE
* New Jersey born, Antonin Scalia is the only child of a Sicilian immigrant and a first-generation Italian-
American, both teachers. He's the first Italian-American to serve on the United States Supreme Court.
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* Graduated first in his class in high school and at Georgetown University. Earned his law degree at
Harvard.
* Served in two positions in the Nixon administration- including a Justice Department post where he
gave legal advice to the president and the attorney general.
* Named to the federal bench by President Reagan in 1982 and the high court in 1986.
* Married and the father of nine children.
* First member of high court with facial hair since Charles Evans Hughes in 1941. He also keeps a social
profile in Washington. Among his loves: opera, pizza with anchovies, and playing the piano and singing at
parties.
* One of the few people who can make fellow Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg laugh (according to the
justice herself).
Copyright @ 1998 by The Christian Science Monitor.
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ARGUING THOMAS' CASE AGAIN;
An Invitation To Speak Raises Anew the Controversy Surrounding
Supreme Court Justice Thomas
The Baltimore Sun
July 28, 1998; Pg. lA
By Lyle Denniston, Sun National Staff
Justice Clarence Thomas plans to make one of his rare ventures from the cloistered privacy of the
Supreme Court tomorrow, and the mere prospect of his appearance on a public platform has again put
him in the middle of controversy.
Thomas is scheduled to be the featured speaker -- after being invited, uninvited and then welcomed
by some -- for the awards luncheon at the convention in Memphis, Tenn., of the National Bar
Association, the nation's largest group of black attorneys. Last night, the invitation was still being
debated.
On Sunday, the association's Judicial Council, made up of association members who are judges,
voted in Memphis to "reconfirm its decision to disinvite him" to speak.
"It makes no more sense to invite Clarence Thomas than it would have been for the National Bar
Association to have invited George Wallace for dinner the day after he had stood in the schoolhouse
door and had shouted 'Segregation today and segregation forever,' " says former Circuit Judge A. Leon
Higginbotham Jr. The retired jurist is leading the drive to withdraw the invitation because he is
outraged by Thomas' opposition to affirmative action programs.
But the association president, Randy K. Jones, a federal prosecutor in San Diego, said yesterday
that Thomas is "still speaking, and we're preparing for him to speak."
The association leaders will not veto an invitation made by one of its groups, Jones added, and that
invitation by the judge who heads the Judicial Council stands.
Bernette J. Johnson, a justice of the Louisiana Supreme Court, the association officer who extended
the invitation, explained her decision in a letter to the group's leaders.
"It is difficult to dialogue," she said, "with someone who has skewed and hostile views on issues
we consider fundamental. [But] progress must sometimes be achieved by engaging the most abhorrent
of foes."
Johnson "is not inclined to rescind the invitation," Jones said yesterday. "I haven't heard anything
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to change that. Justice Thomas' speaking is not intended to be an endorsement of him or his philosophy.
He will be a speaker -- nothing more."
Thomas is in Memphis today, and court aides said he plans to go ahead with the luncheon talk. The
C-SPAN cable network will broadcast the speech on a delayed basis tomorrow and repeat it twice on
its "America and the Courts" program Saturday.
None of Thomas' eight colleagues arouses the kind of protest that can ensue when Thomas gets an
invitation to make a public speech. Only the late Chief Justice Earl Warren's public speeches came close
to provoking the kind of outrage that Thomas can almost routinely expect.
Almost commonplace
The sometimes emotional dispute within the bar association about Thomas over the past several
weeks is almost commonplace for the justice. The youngest member of the court -- he turned 50 in
June -- Thomas has been vilified by critics through his seven years as the nation's highest-ranking black
official.
His practice of voting on the most conservative side of major Supreme Court cases -- especially on
civil rights issues -- keeps the controversy surrounding him fresh, especially among black observers and
organizations.
Although there have been some recent signs that he is voting less consistently with the court's most
vocal conservative, Justice Antonin Scalia, Thomas' voting pattern is, if anything, becoming more
conservative overall than Scalia's, observers say. It is Scalia who has occasionally turned ever so
slightly to the left.
During the recently ended term, the two conservatives split four times on 5-4 rulings -- the first time
in their years together that they have divided on such closedly contested decisions.
Thomas seldom confronts directly his critics outside the court, although he does make public
appearances, they are usually before friendly audiences. He is considered to be the most withdrawn
justice -- a withdrawal that his associates say is self-protective.
Twice before, he has been invited to speak, and then uninvited.
On one of those occasions, he was reinvited and went ahead with a speech to a parent-teacher
organization in Prince George's County.
On the other, he chose not to appear at a youth festival in Delaware, so as not to disrupt it when
the Maryland chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People protested
his appearance.
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The justice's topic tomorrow has not been disclosed and, following his usual practice, he will not
release the text of his remarks. Whatever he says, however, the fact that he will speak at all has aroused
critics who will be in Memphis -- including some who are hostile because of his opposition to
affirmative action programs.
Demonstrations planned
A. J. Cooper, a Washington attorney and former bar association officer who has publicly defended
the Judicial Council decision to "disinvite" Thomas, said, "There are plans for demonstrations if he
attempts to speak."
Cooper, who went to Memphis last night, commented: "Some say we are keeping Justice Thomas
from having his say. He has his say approximately 100 times a year and has had his say approximately
600 or 700 times."
Cooper asked, "If he won't speak for us, why should he speak to us?"
After Thomas finishes speaking tomorrow, his judicial views are certain to be skewered at a
convention seminar on "The Supreme Court and Civil Rights," which has a panel including
Higginbotham.
From the day Thomas was put on the Supreme Court after a bitter Senate fight in 1991, the liberal
Higginbotham, who is black and now a Harvard professor, has been using journal articles and speeches
to lecture Thomas on his obligations as a black judge.
In a May letter to Johnson, Higginbotham said, "I do not believe that thousands of African-
Americans, Mexican-Americans and other minorities feel that, after he has consistently voted to deny
them fair options, Justice Thomas should be welcomed to any family table for any kind of dialogue."
Copyright 0 1998 The Baltimore Sun Company.
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JUSTICE THOMAS DEFENDS VIEWPOINTS
AP Online
July 29, 1998
By Richard Carelli
MEMPHIS, Tenn. (AP) - Declaring his independence from other prominent blacks, Supreme Court
Justice Clarence Thomas told critics Wednesday he intends to continue opposing affirmative action and hold
fast to other conservative views.
"I make no apologies ... nor do I intend to do so in the future," Thomas told nearly 1,000 black lawyers
and judges at the National Bar Association's convention.
For years denounced by minority-rights groups, Thomas had decided to attend the convention even after
some members sought to rescind his invitation and keep him away.
"I come here today not in anger or to anger ... not to defend my views but to assert my right to think for
myself," Thomas said. He told his critics to stop telling him "I have no right to think the way I do because
I'm black."
About affirmative action, he said, "Any effort, policy or program that (in some way accepts the notion)
that blacks are inferior is a non-starter with me."
The only black on the nation's highest court, Thomas complained about being "singled out for particularly
bilious and venomous assaults" by fellow blacks.
Although he often speaks on college campuses and elsewhere outside Washington, Thomas most often
confines his comments to inspirational, up-from-the-bootstraps messages. Never before had he tried to take
on his critics so fully.
He said he is deeply hurt when portrayed as an enemy of his race. "Isn't it time to move on ... to realize
that being angry with me is no solution? Isn't it time that we respect ourselves and each other as we have
demanded respect from others?" the justice asked.
His comments drew little applause and some scattered boos. A threatened walkout did not materialize,
however. Speaking ahead of Thomas, Illinois trial judge Shelvin Hall of Chicago was given a standing
ovation when she attacked "those who will denigrate the
gains of the civil rights movement."
Without mentioning Thomas' name, Hall said, "We do not applaud- and yes, we are offended by- those
who would willfully destroy the sacrifices" of such black heroes as Martin Luther King and Thurgood
Marshall, the justice Thomas replaced in 1991.
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But National Bar Association President Randy Jones, a federal prosecutor in San Diego, said afterwards
of Thomas, "He spoke from the heart. He's a man who's not afraid to come into the lion's den and face his
detractors and critics. I think we all have to respect him for that."
Much of Thomas' 35-minute speech touched on such frequently visited themes as his grandfather's
wisdom, the racism he experienced as a seminary student and his fling as a black revolutionary in the late
1960s. He took no questions.
While never raising his voice, Thomas ridiculed as "psycho-silliness" criticism that his conservative views
spring from racial self-hatred or a denunciation of his roots.
"I have few racial identification problems," he said. "Nor do I need anyone telling me who I am ... I am
a man. A black man. An American."
He urged his audience against falling prey to some "monolithic view of blacks," of accepting opinions
"assigned to blacks."
Thomas contended that some of his most controversial opinions have been mischaracterized.
"I can't help but wonder if some of my critics can read," he said in referring to a dissenting opinion in
which he said the Constitution's ban against cruel and unusual punishment is not violated when prison guards
beat an inmate but inflict no lasting injuries.
Reading from his opinion, Thomas noted that he had called such conduct possibly immoral and illegal,
and perhaps even remediable under some other constitutional provision.
To characterize his vote as one condoning such conduct, he said, would take a critic who is "either
illiterate or fraught with malice."
Many of Thomas' comments appeared aimed at his most prominent critic, retired federal judge A. Leon
Higginbotham, who was instrumental in the move to keep Thomas from appearing.
After Thomas was invited by Louisiana Supreme Court Judge Bernette Johnson to speak, Higginbotham
criticized her for having given the justice "an imprimatur that he has never had from any responsible
organization within the African-American community or any non-
conservative groups of whites."
Thomas said, "Not one of us has the gospel. Not one of us can claim infalability ... None of us has been
appointed by God."
Copyright @1998 The Associated Press.
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CLINTON'S JUSTICES PAVE SUPREME COURT'S MIDDLE ROAD WITH
ANOTHER TERM UNDER THEIR BELTS, TWO NEWEST JURISTS BRAKE
COURT'S RIGHTWARD MOMENTUM
Christian Science Monitor
July 9, 1998
By Robert Marquand, Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor
Of the nine justices on the United States Supreme Court, Republican presidents named seven and
President Clinton- the first Democrat in the Oval Office since 1980- named two.
Now, as history begins to define Mr. Clinton's legacy, his appointments of Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg
and Stephen Breyer may win a spot near the top of his achievement list.
Without doubt, the Clinton appointees are acting as the brake on a court that was moving rapidly toward
cultural conservatism and limits on individual rights, say many court observers. Especially when the justices
cannot reach consensus, as is often the case, the two newest
members are steering the court in a more mainstream direction.
"Without [Justices] Ginsburg and Breyer, you have a radically different jurisprudence on the court," says
David O'Brien, who publishes an annual Supreme Court review. "Voting rights and affirmative action are
overturned completely. More acts of Congress are overturned. You would see a reversal of Roe v. Wade[affirming a woman's right to abortion]."
Other cases that might have turned out differently include one from the Virginia Military Institute (VMI),
in which the court struck down all-male public colleges. The two newcomers frown on the death penalty,but have not tried to abolish it. They favor drawing voter districts in a way that considers race, but not
ardently.
As Ginsburg begins her sixth year and Breyer his fifth on the Supreme Court, the pair is helping to shape
a strong moderate wing. Moreover, with an impeccable civility and quiet demeanor, they are tempering a
body that had been riven with ideological fissures and
personal antipathy, sources close to the court say.
Of the two, the biggest surprise may be Breyer, a federal judge and Harvard professor who joined the
court in 1994. Breyer was early labeled a gray legal technocrat. Yet his ringing dissent in the recent line-
item-veto case and his role as lead dissenter in last year's epic term show him emerging as a questioner of
states' rights and "original intent"-- the leading vision of jurisprudence coming from the conservative wing.
In dissenting with the majority decision to strike down the presidential line-item veto, Breyer contrasts
the size of the US population, budget, and government in 1789 with the vastly larger conditions today.
Whereas the majority held that the new presidential power violated the Constitution's "separation of powers,"
Breyer argues that the literal reading should not prevail
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and that the court should remember the "genius of the Framers' pragmatic vision ... in cases that find
constitutional room for necessary ... innovation." The Constitution, he says, was framed to be an evolving
document.
Ginsburg, confirmed in 1993, is a steady moderate whose main impact is in gender issues. Her majority
opinion in the VMI case broke new ground in equal protection for women, but overall she has taken on fewer
fights than Breyer has. Of the four core justices of the moderate xing. which includes Bush appointee David
Souter and Ford appointee John Paul Stevens, Ginsburg is probably the most conservative, particularly in
criminal law. She epitomizes a new "judicial restraint" on the left, argues Jeffrey Rosen of the The New
Republic. In one sense, this tempered position may make Ginsburg an ideal candidate for chief justice if
William Rehnquist should resign and if a Democrat appoints his successor.
"Breyer is hitting his stride. He's found his voice as the pragmatic modem critic of the Rehnquist court,"
says Tom Baker at Drake University in Des Moines, Iowa. "Ginsburg seems to be a kind of left analog of
[Justice Sandra Day] O'Connor, the swing vote, which is a strong position to be in."
Breyer, who spent most of his life in Cambridge, Mass., is married to a member of the British aristocracy.
He has a reported fondness for Humphrey Bogart films. Friends say he's a brilliant thinker who at Harvard
had a red Chevrolet he was generous about lending. He was counsel to the Senate Judiciary Committee in
the late '70s, where he wrote the airline- deregulation law- and where he developed an expertise on
Congress that regularly appears in his opinions.
Ginsburg, known as the Thurgood Marshall of women's legal rights, is from Brooklyn, New York. She
spent 10 years as a professor at Columbia University and slightly more on the US Court of Appeals in
Washington. Her husband is a Washington lawyer, and the two are avid opera fans who often travel to music
festivals during the summer. She is controversial in some liberal circles for criticizing the grounds on which
Roe v. Wade was decided.
Both appointees are lively on the bench. During argument in one case this term, which asked whether
an American father of a foreign-born, out-of-wedlock child could later claim US citizenship for the child (a
right mothers already have), Ginsburg delivered a set of legal body blows to Justices Rehnquist and Antonin
Scalia. When the lawyer for the father faltered under fire from the two jurists, Ginsburg took over the entire
position of advocacy for the lawyer.
This give and take on the bench represents a new esprit de corps on the Rehnquist court, one the two
newcomers have cultivated. Some observers say they bring a more open discourse to the oral arguments,
which had tapered off during the 1980s, reflecting a sullenness that matched the ideological strife in
chambers. Indeed, they say, Ginsburg's and Breyer's willingness to "mix it up" with other members during
arguments may be playing a bigger role in affecting how the justices ultimately cast their votes.
Copyright @ 1998 by The Christian Science Monitor.
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RETIREMENT COULD BE ON THE DOCKET
USA Today
June 26, 1998
By Tony Mauro
WASHINGTON -- Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens is a chipper 78-year-old who often
flies to his condominium in Florida to squeeze in games of tennis and bridge between court cases.
He has said nothing to encourage rumors that he is thinking of retiring, and has hired law clerks for
the fall term that begins October 5.
Yet the rumors persist that today, the last day of the current term, Stevens may announce his
retirement after 23 years on the high court.
If he does, the Washington, D.C., rumor mill has already produced a small list of possible
replacements for Stevens, including two federal appeals judges who would be firsts if named to the
Supreme Court:
Jose Cabranes of Connecticut, who would be the first Hispanic justice in history.
David Tatel of Washington, D.C., who is blind and would be the first justice appointed with such
a disability.
The Stevens retirement rumors seem fueled by the national political calendar.
Stevens was appointed to the high court by Republican President Ford, but many court-watchers
who appraise him as a moderate guess that Stevens would rather have his replacement named by
Democratic President Clinton than by a possibly Republican successor to Clinton
in the year 2001.
And if that assumption is correct, some think this would be the best year for Stevens to retire,
before presidential politics and Clinton's scandal-weakened state make naming a replacement more
difficult.
Arguing against the rumors, however, is the strong tradition of justices remaining on the bench as
long as possible, until failing health makes retirement necessary.
"Justice Stevens still seems very vigorous physically and in his analysis," says Washington, D.C.,
lawyer Theodore Boutrous Jr. "Everything seems to suggest he will keep on going."
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But if Stevens does leave, it is clear that Clinton will be under heavy pressure to name a Hispanic
to fill the vacancy.
Hispanics twice have been passed over by Clinton- in 1993 with the nomination of Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, and in 1994 with Stephen Breyer.
If Clinton has another vacancy to fill, possibly the last of his presidency, the lobbying to appoint a
Hispanic will escalate.
Cabranes, 57, was born in Puerto Rico and is a respected member of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit.
If Clinton heads in another direction, one name that is mentioned is that of Tatel, 56, a former civil
rights lawyer who has been an appeals judge since 1994. He has been blind from a degenerative eye
disease for 24 years.
USA TODAY Copyright @1998.
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SUPREME POLITICS: WHO'D REPLACE JUSTICE STEVENS?
The Wall Street Journal
May 29, 1998
Potomac Watch
By Paul A. Gigot
President Clinton could soon make his third Supreme Court appointment, and his political play will
be to trump Senate Republicans by naming the first Hispanic justice.
Such speculation is in high gear among Republicans because the White House is already floating
the names of potential replacements should Justice John Paul Stevens pack it in when the high court's
term ends in the next month.
Retirement for the flinty, independent 78-year-old justice is no sure thing. Merely hearing such
speculation could cause him to stay on, and by all accounts he's in good mental and physical health. It's
also clear from his Clinton v. Jones opinion that he's no great admirer of this president.
But friends who've spoken with Justice Stevens say that for the first time he seems like a man
seriously contemplating retirement. He already spends much of his time in Florida, where his wife
wouldn't mind seeing him more. He's also talked about the subject with more than one of his bench
colleagues.
The timing would certainly make ideological sense for the court's ranking liberal. By retiring this
year, he'd shelter his successor's confirmation from the presidential politics that will be going strong
next summer. A Clinton nominee next year would also probably face a Senate with even more
Republicans than the current 55.
If Mr. Stevens waits until the summer of 2000, he'd run the risk that his successor would be named
by a conservative president. While the justice appointed by Gerald Ford likes to claim GOP credentials,
you can bet he doesn't want to be replaced by another Antonin Scalia. If he wants to preserve the
current court's precarious liberal-conservative balance, this is the year to depart.
The biggest beneficiary would be Mr. Clinton, who is eager to pad his lackluster legacy. That argues
for naming the first Hispanic justice, an act of symbolic politics that would enhance Democratic ties
to the nation's fastest growing ethnic group.
The move would also mousetrap Senate Republicans, who will be loathe to oppose anyone with a
Hispanic surname. Still smarting from the backlash against their anti-immigration idiocy of 1994-96,
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some Republicans would vote to confirm Geraldo Rivera.
And the problem is, they might have to vote on the judicial equivalent. The lineup of qualified
Hispanic Democratic judges is shorter than admirers of Monica Lewinsky's lawyer William Ginsburg.
A list submitted to the White House (and delivered in person to Vice President Al Gore) by the
Hispanic National Bar Association contains only six mostly minor-league names.
Voters recalled Cruz Reynoso from the California bench along with Rose Bird in 1986. Vilma
Martinez has been a liberal civil-rights litigator. Gilbert Casellas ran the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission but has been passed over by Mr. Clinton for the appellate bench.
The list's one genuine legal heavyweight is Jose Cabranes, a Puerto Rican immigrant named to the
federal Second Circuit by Mr. Clinton in 1994. A former Yale general counsel, Judge Cabranes was
advertised as a finalist when the president made his last Supreme Court pick. He's a judicial moderate
and his confirmation would be a bipartisan breeze.
But his very moderation is making him less acceptable to many Clintonites this time. White House
aides are already telling Senate sources and others that Mr. Cabranes isn't reliably liberal enough to
replace Justice Stevens. He's especially suspect on the liberal orthodoxy of classifying everyone by
racial and ethnic identity. He's no conservative, but he's spoken out publicly for the "Western
civilization curriculum" attacked by the left.
Liberals also fret about the influence of Mr. Cabranes's daughter, whose sin is to have belonged to
the Federalist Society and to have clerked for Judge Ralph Winter, a Reagan appointee. It may seem
odd to blame a father for the beliefs of his daughter, but Clinton liberals believe in guilt by conservative
association.
If liberals do prevail, the president could turn to 43-year-old New York district court judge Sonia
Sotomayor. She's every Republican's confirmation nightmare -- a liberal Hispanic woman put on the
district bench by George Bush (at the request of Democratic Sen. Pat Moynihan).
Her willingness to legislate from the bench was apparent in her recent decision that a private group
giving work experience to the homeless must pay the minimum wage. Never mind if this makes them
that much harder to employ. Mr. Clinton has nominated Judge Sotomayor to join Mr. Cabranes on the
Second Circuit, and she's said to be a favorite of Hillary Rodham Clinton.
All of which means that a Stevens retirement would put a large political burden on the protean
shoulders of Judiciary Chairman Orrin Hatch. His own choice would probably be Judge Cabranes. And
the Utah Republican has privately explained his brisk approval of Clinton lower-court nominees as a
way to gain leverage and credibility for the more significant Supreme Court pick. But Mr. Clinton has
fooled Republicans before.
Copyright 0 1998 by The Wall Street Journal.
68
